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Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Employment Programmes for 
Ex-Combatants: A Case Study 
of Nigeria’s Post Amnesty 
Programme (PAP)*
Tarila Marclint Ebiede1
Abstract Employment of ex-militants is an important part of disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes in societies emerging 
from armed conflicts. In this article, I examine the potential of Nigeria’s 
Post Amnesty Programme (PAP), a locally designed DDR programme, to 
contribute to the employment of ex-militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta 
region. I show that although the programme has focused on training, its 
design and implementation has not been informed by a clear understanding 
of the private sector environment where ex-militants are expected to find 
work in the Niger Delta. I demonstrate empirically how programmes that 
are designed to address employment of ex-militants can easily fall short of 
expectations. I suggest that a baseline understanding of the needs of private 
sector employers is an essential part of youth employment programmes in 
fragile and conflict-affected societies.
Keywords: youths, ex-militants, jobs, private sector, peace-building.
1 Introduction
Youth employment is one of  the most urgent development challenges 
facing policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa. Youth unemployment in 
this region is about 11 per cent (ILO 2017), a proportion that seems 
relatively small when compared to other regions of  the world but 
which, in the context of  sub-Saharan Africa’s large population, clearly 
designates a very large number of  unemployed youth. Approximately 
12 million young people enter into the workforce each year, but only 
about 3 million jobs are created annually (AfDB 2017). The challenge 
of  youth employment is particularly urgent in societies that have been 
affected by violent conflicts, where economic development is low, 
infrastructure is absent, and the private sector, in which youths are 
expected to seek employment, is weak.
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In societies recovering from violent conflicts, the unemployment 
problem is particularly prevalent among youths who have been involved 
in fighting and have become ex-combatants in the post-conflict phase. 
This is one of  the specific problems that reintegration programmes are 
designed to address (Munive 2014). Reintegration is a process whereby 
ex-combatants acquire civilian status through sustainable employment 
and incomes (United Nations 2010). The reintegration process is 
supposed to be facilitated by vocational skills training, job creation, 
entrepreneurship support, psychological reorientation, and family 
support (Berdal 1996). However, the available evidence suggests that 
reintegration programmes often fail to create sustainable employment 
for ex-combatants (Blattman and Ralston 2015).
Policymakers in Nigeria face the challenge of  generating employment 
for ex-militants in the country’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. In 2009, 
the Nigerian government implemented a disarmament, demobilisation, 
and reintegration (DDR) programme for armed groups in the Niger 
Delta, which is known locally as the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP). 
The PAP includes programmes designed to support knowledge and 
skills acquisition, financial empowerment, internships, microcredit, and 
education to facilitate long-term employment for ex-militants.2
The Nigerian government claims that the PAP has successfully 
addressed the challenge of  youth unemployment among ex-militants 
in the Niger Delta. However, in this article, I argue that the PAP has 
largely failed to facilitate the rehabilitation through employment of  
large numbers of  ex-militants in the region. There is a gap between 
the government’s claims and verifiable figures on the employment rates 
of  former militants. For example, the government has claimed that it 
registered 30,000 ex-militants in the PAP (Gist Magazine 2013), yet it 
has only provided training for 15,459 individuals (PAP 2015). Data on 
actual levels of  employment resulting from the programme are scarce, 
but the last official figures show that only 2,072 participants in the PAP 
have found jobs (Omonobi 2014).
I identify three factors that account for this failure: (1) the lack of  an 
assessment of  the needs of  private sector employers, (2) a flawed incentive 
structure for PAP participants, and (3) the lack of  a politically feasible 
strategy for winding up the programme. As a result, the PAP has become 
a disguised subsidy programme for unemployed and underemployed 
youth in the Niger Delta, representing an open-ended burden on public 
finances. To improve this outcome, I argue that the PAP requires reform 
to achieve a better targeting of  the skills and capabilities needed by 
employers, more effective implementation, and a clearly identified route 
to transition from the PAP into sustainable employment.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of  the PAP. Section 3 discusses the focus on the private sector as a 
potential employer of  youth in the Niger Delta. Section 4 analyses the 
implementation of  the PAP and explores the available evidence on 
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the employment of  ex-militants in the Niger Delta. It explains how 
a realistic assessment of  the needs of  the private sector is a missing 
ingredient within the PAP. This has undermined the programme’s 
principal objective to facilitate youth employment in the Niger Delta. 
Section 5 summarises the argument and concludes.
2 An overview of the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP)
Protests, agitations, and civil disobedience by youths in oil-producing 
communities have characterised Nigeria’s Niger Delta in the last three 
decades (Omotola 2009). The underlying driver of  these agitations is 
that communities are not benefiting from the oil extraction that takes 
place on their land. Beginning in the late 1990s, youths demanding 
increased development and an end to environmental degradation 
in the Niger Delta organised mass protests against international oil 
companies (IOCs) and the Federal Government of  Nigeria (FGN). 
These protests evolved into an armed militant struggle in 2005. Youths 
belonging to different militant groups focused on sabotaging oil industry 
infrastructure and critical assets, and kidnapping expatriates working in 
the oil industry (Ibaba 2011). These attacks led to a significant reduction 
of  crude oil production in Nigeria, from 2.5 million barrels per day in 
2005 to about 2 million barrels per day in the first quarter of  2006. 
Nigeria’s oil production did not rise above 2.2 million barrels per day 
throughout the period of  the insurgency.
Table 1 The disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration components of the Post Amnesty Programme
Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration
Duration: 6 August–4 October 2009 Duration: 6–12 months Duration: Up to 5 years
Collection of arms, ammunition and 
explosives, etc.
Documentation and biometrics
Ex-militants report to camp
Verification and documentation
Transformational training
Peace-building and conflict resolution
Counselling
Career guidance
Wellness assessment
Reintegration classification
Education and vocational placement
Graduation and demobilisation
Knowledge and skills acquisition
Financial empowerment
Placement programmes
Microcredit
Education
Reconciliation with local community
Conflict resolution framework/
mechanism
Monitoring and evaluation
Exit of programme
Disarmament camps
Media campaign
Transformational training centres
Rehabilitation camps
Partnering government agencies, 
NGOs, and private organisations
Tracking and support framework
Source PAP (2009). First Plan of the Presidential Committee for Amnesty, Abuja.
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Another steep decline in production occurred in 2008, and in the third 
quarter of  2009, production stood at only 1.75 million barrels per day. 
Industry and government revenues from crude oil sales fell during this 
period. The government came under pressure to find solutions and 
bring the armed insurgency to an end (Ukiwo 2016). In May 2007, a 
new government, led by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, opened 
negotiations with armed groups in the Niger Delta. In May 2009, the 
President proclaimed an amnesty for all armed groups in the Delta. As 
part of  the peace process, the PAP was designed as a DDR programme 
for militants who agreed to renounce violence and accept an amnesty 
(see Table 1).
Disarmament exercises were carried out by the Nigerian military in the 
major cities of  Warri, Yenagoa, and Port Harcourt from the beginning 
of  August to the end of  October 2009. At the end of  the disarmament 
exercise, the FGN claimed that it had identified and registered 30,000 
participants in the PAP. Many ex-militants signed up for the programme 
when leaders of  militant groups endorsed it. The former militants 
were accommodated in camps, in a bid to separate them from their 
former armed groups. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
were contracted by the FGN to carry out reorientation programmes, 
which taught ex-militants peaceful methods of  conflict resolution, 
human rights, and the rule of  law. Career counselling was provided, in 
preparation for the reintegration phase. The first phase came to an end 
in 2010, having prepared the stage for former militants to reintegrate 
into their communities.
The committee constituted by the  to oversee the PAP proposed 
a reintegration plan that focused on offering bespoke courses of  
vocational skills acquisition (PAP 2009). It was estimated initially that 
this plan would cost the Nigerian government US$360 million. Over 
time, the cost of  the training component of  the PAP has increased 
to more than US$1 billion. According to a PAP official, this increase 
resulted from changes in the design of  the programme. The initial 
plan envisaged the provision of  bespoke training exercises by the PAP 
itself, whereas the revised programme provided access to training 
opportunities, extending beyond nine months’ duration, which would 
lead to international certifications.3
PAP participants were placed in educational institutions and training 
centres in Europe, North America, Asia, South Africa, and West 
Africa, as well as private institutions in Nigeria. Vocational training was 
arranged in areas such as marine technology, heavy duty equipment 
operations, welding, diving, agriculture, boat building, aviation, fashion 
design, hotel and catering, cosmetology, and hair dressing (Gist Magazine 
2013). Academic training focused on undergraduate degrees such as 
law, political science, business management, mass communication, 
international relations, public administration, medicine, engineering, 
applied sciences, building and construction, and information and 
communications technology (ICT) (ibid.).
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Youth unemployment in the Niger Delta has often been blamed on 
a lack of  education and skills. Indeed, many youths who took part 
in armed militancy blamed the lack of  employment opportunities 
as a reason for joining armed groups (Oyefusi 2008). The enhanced 
provision of  educational and vocational training in the PAP was 
intended to address this problem (Ajibola 2015). In particular, it was 
expected that these training programmes would enable ex-militants to 
find work in the private sector (Kuku 2012).
Although the PAP was designed to enable youths participating in the 
programme to find work in the private sector as a whole, the programme 
focused heavily on the oil and gas sectors, in particular. According to PAP 
officials, this emphasis was designed in response to the interest expressed 
by local youths to engage in the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta.4 
As will be shown in the analysis, the majority of  ex-militants selected 
training opportunities that could enable them to seek employment in the 
oil industry. However, while private companies within the oil industry 
are the dominant private sector interests in the Niger Delta, the extent to 
which they are able to provide employment for youths remains contested.
3 The private sector and youth employment in the Niger Delta
Youth unemployment is a general challenge across Nigeria (Ismail 
2016). Recent data indicate that about one third of  Nigerian youths 
have been unable to find gainful employment (NBS 2018). The issue 
cuts across the country’s 36 states, including the oil-rich Niger Delta. 
Youth unemployment rates in Rivers State (41.82 per cent) and 
Akwa Ibom State (36.58 per cent) are significantly above the national 
average, while the state of  Bayelsa is slightly below the national 
average at 30.36 per cent. The data on youth unemployment in the 
Niger Delta are not a surprise as youth employment is generally a 
challenge in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). There is a 
general concern that high levels of  youth unemployment contribute 
to criminality or mobilisation for armed violence (Izzi 2013); however, 
there is no confirmed relationship between unemployment and crime 
in the long term (Janko and Popli 2015). Nonetheless, tackling youth 
unemployment and underemployment are seen as important objectives 
for building peace and stability in FCAS (Enria 2014).
The Niger Delta is a fragile and conflict-affected region. Fragility 
and violence in the Delta have been driven largely by the exploration 
and extraction of  crude oil resources, which are carried out as a 
joint venture between the Nigerian government and private sector 
operators. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
represents government interests in the oil sector, alongside a number 
of  international and national oil companies which play a significant 
role, especially in the exploration and extraction of  crude oil, as well 
as the construction and operation of  oil production facilities. However, 
while the private sector is a major player in the oil sector in the Delta, 
the region’s dependence on oil and gas has not helped private sector 
growth in other areas of  the economy. The Niger Delta is an example 
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of  the resource curse thesis, which argues that an abundance of  natural 
resources stifles economic growth and development, and can lead to 
violent conflict. Scholars that have theorised on the resource curse thesis 
have drawn empirical evidence from sub-Saharan African countries 
such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of  Congo, Zimbabwe, and 
Angola (Badeeb, Lean and Clark 2017).
The negative impact of  natural resource conflicts on private sector 
growth in FCAS has significant implications for job creation and youth 
employment. The private sector faces particular challenges in FCAS, 
which are typically characterised by a weak regulatory and judicial 
environment, hard-to-enforce property rights, a lack of  policy and fiscal 
frameworks, criminality and corruption, a lack of  basic infrastructure 
and services such as electricity, high business risks, and security threats, 
which make it challenging for private enterprises to thrive (Eriksson 
Baaz, Olsson and Verweijen 2018; Mac Sweeney 2009; Peschka, Emery 
and Martin 2011). According to Peschka et al.:
The impact of  conflict, violence, and prolonged fragility is 
particularly pervasive on the legitimate formal private sector. Foreign 
and local investors alike flee the country, taking with them longer-
term capital, skills, jobs, and technology and further undermining 
local private sector support institutions (such as chambers of  
commerce)… The businesspeople who do stay face difficulty in 
accessing finance, are often harassed or co-opted by increasingly 
corrupt government and military and/or by militias, and may find it 
harder to import necessary goods or export their products (2011: 15).
Unsurprisingly, FCAS occupy the bottom rungs of  the World Bank’s 
Ease of  Doing Business Index (World Bank 2018: 4). In FCAS, political 
logics often overtake the production logics that shape private sector 
activity in more stable societies (Castel-Branco, Cramer and Hailu 
2001). Private actors may even be involved in political and economic 
relationships and practices that help to sustain conflict, violence, and 
instability (Oetzel, Getz and Ladek 2007). They may profit directly from 
involvement in war as providers of  services and equipment to warring 
parties, or they may be involved in the extraction of  natural resources, 
which is often at the heart of  such conflicts.
Some analysts have identified these negative dynamics in relation to the 
involvement of  businesses in the Niger Delta (Frynas 2001). The armed 
militancy that characterised the Niger Delta region was directly linked 
to contestation over the oil industry’s activities. Key actors in this conflict 
were armed militants, local politicians, the FGN, and IOCs operating in 
the Delta. The corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of  IOCs 
fuelled conflicts and empowered armed militants in some communities 
(Ebiede 2017). IOCs reformed their CSR practices to address some 
of  these shortcomings (Ite 2007). However, recent analysis suggests 
that contestation over oil resources and the activities of  the oil industry 
continue to fuel conflict in the Niger Delta (Bendana et al. 2018).
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Revenues of  regional government in the Niger Delta are derived almost 
exclusively from the oil sector. The government’s focus on oil revenues 
has also limited the development of  appropriate policies that can 
facilitate private sector growth. Oil revenues have been lost to corruption 
within government. Even where government funds infrastructure 
development, there is no evidence to suggest that such investment leads 
to private sector growth in the region. There is also no evidence that such 
investments form part of  an overarching strategy to foster the emergence 
of  private sector-led economic development in the region.
IOCs dominate the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta. Although 
the industry is profitable, hydrocarbon extraction and the associated 
value chains do not generate many jobs for young people. In 2005, it 
was estimated that the oil and gas industry accounts for only about 
65,000 direct and 250,000 indirect jobs in Nigeria as a whole (Fajana 
2005). In 2017, the National Bureau of  Statistics, Nigeria (NBS) 
estimated that the oil industry and extractive sector in the country 
employ only about 1 per cent of  the entire labour force of  Nigeria. This 
illustrates that the oil industry is not the type of  private sector activity 
that can generate wide-scale employment in the Niger Delta.
According to the NBS, the key employers of  labour in Nigeria and 
the Niger Delta are mainly small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
the agricultural, hotel, tourism and entertainment, food and catering, 
education, and transport sectors. While these sectors are flourishing, they 
are not fully developed. Formal private sector service delivery in the Niger 
Delta remains weak and is largely confined to the urban areas. The lack 
of  infrastructure in rural areas of  the Niger Delta makes it difficult for 
private sector actors to thrive. Even in urban areas, companies involved in 
manufacturing, hospitality and tourism, food, and catering lack basic and 
fundamental infrastructures, such as electricity supply.
The exploration and production of  crude oil has polluted the 
environment, reducing the productivity of  agricultural activities in the 
region (Opukri and Ibaba 2008). Yet, agriculture is the single largest 
employer of  labour in the Delta (Nextier Advisory and SDN 2016). The 
absence of  a thriving non-oil private sector is said to limit the ‘creation 
of  markets, and access to other factors of  economic progress’, which are 
essential to the provision of  jobs for youths in the Niger Delta (ibid.: 4).
Despite these challenges, scholars and policymakers remain adamant 
that the private sector has an important role to play in stabilising 
FCAS, through the creation of  jobs and the provision of  financial and 
other resources to support local entrepreneurs (Bray 2009; Peschka 
et al. 2011). It is argued that development actors, including aid donors 
and the state, can build an effective market system with space for 
private sector players to operate, as part of  their efforts to strengthen 
the economic systems of  FCAS (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010). These 
strategies are supposed to enhance job creation in the private sector, as a 
contribution to the stabilisation of  FCAS.
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The private sector remains the largest employer of  labour in the Niger 
Delta. Entrepreneurial individuals still seek to engage in private business 
activities in various sectors of  the economy. The training component of  
the PAP makes clear that the programme was designed to steer youths 
towards employment in the private sector, yet this aspiration has not 
been achieved. It is therefore important to examine why the PAP has 
not been able to achieve this objective.
Table 2 Reintegration training provided to ex-militants under the Post Amnesty 
Programme
Area of specialisation Number trained
Education:
• Nigerian universities
• Foreign universities
1,620
1,454
Welding and fabrication 5,194
Entrepreneurship 2,798
Maritime 1,086
Crane and heavy duty 1,030
Pipefitting 250
Boat building 299
Agriculture 239
Automobile 207
Electrical installation 89
Aviation:
Engineers
• Pilot (fixed wing)
• Helicopter
• Instructors
138
71
21
5
Diving 230
Drilling 197
Health, safety and environment 104
Industry automation 86
Entertainment 60
Instrumentation 46
Total 15,224
Source Office of the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta, 
October 2015 (unpublished).
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4 The Post Amnesty Programme and youth employment in the 
Niger Delta
Institutions of  the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta have 
implemented various programmes to address the youth employment 
challenge, including several skills acquisition and training programmes 
led by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the 
Ministry of  Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA). In addition to these are 
programmes implemented by IOCs and the Nigerian Local Content 
Management Board (NLCMB). These programmes are meant for all 
youths in the Niger Delta. However, the PAP was specifically designed 
to address the challenge of  employment among youths who have been 
involved in armed militancy in the Niger Delta.
The design of  the PAP reflected arguments that unemployment was one of  
the reasons for the mobilisation of  youths into militant groups (Oluwaniyi 
2010). Former militants were expected to undertake both vocational and 
educational training. The vocational training component focused on 
agriculture, agro-allied processing, transportation, cold-room management, 
ICT, maritime services, building and construction professionals, oil and gas, 
and environment and sanitation. By 2015, it was estimated that 15,459 out 
of  30,000 registered ex-militants had undergone various PAP-sponsored 
training programmes, both in Nigeria and overseas (see Table 2).
With a few exceptions, such as entrepreneurship and entertainment, 
most of  the types of  training offered were aimed at skills needed 
within the oil industry, including welding and fabrication (5,194), 
entrepreneurship (2,798), maritime (1,086), and crane and heavy duty 
machinery operation (1,030). As well as responding to the participants’ 
own demands, the array of  training opportunities provided was informed 
by government officials’ assumption that oil companies would provide 
jobs for ex-militants.5 However, the oil industry is not a major employer 
of  labour within the private sector in the Niger Delta. Interviews with 
PAP officials revealed that the programme’s training component was 
not informed by a baseline study of  employment opportunities actually 
available within the private sector in the Niger Delta. As a result, the 
focus on the oil industry did not capture the economic realities of  the 
employment situation in the region. A study by the Foundation for 
Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), an NGO focused on 
community development, made the following assertions:
The strong presence of  the oil industry in the Delta has resulted in 
the relative shrinkage of  other local industries, such as manufacturing. 
That is, the lure of  high salaries perceived to be associated with oil 
sector jobs, makes all other forms of  employment less desirable. 
Unstable markets and wide-scale importation have likewise worked to 
stifle other economic sectors, including agriculture, aquaculture and 
construction. With poor linkages between the market and vocational 
training (i.e. matching demand for labor with appropriately trained 
supply of  labor) the result is a large, youthful population that is unable 
to find decent work (PIND 2011: 16).
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The PIND report also noted that ‘in terms of  skills and competencies, 
youth tend to fall below the required expectations of  employers’ 
(ibid.: 19). This situation reflects wider debates in the youth employment 
literature about balancing demand and supply factors (Darvas and 
Palmer 2014). Employers seek human capital that is capable of  
increasing their business output. However, while labour is abundant in 
societies with high unemployment, the specific skills needed by thriving 
businesses are often scarce. This mismatch between labour demand 
and supply is a key factor underlying the youth employment challenge 
in FCAS. The gap persists in programmes such as the PAP, which are 
designed to help youths into paid work.
The PAP incentive structure also failed to take into account the realities 
of  the local job market. To support the livelihoods of  ex-militants 
while they underwent training and awaited gainful employment, the 
PAP paid a monthly stipend worth about US$400 to participants in 
the programme, from the moment they enrolled and for an indefinite 
period. To the young former militants, this financial incentive was 
one of  the key attractions of  the PAP.6 However, the stipend was set 
at a level higher than the monthly wages available locally to artisans 
and skilled workers. Currently, the minimum wage in Nigeria is only 
US$60 per month. Although formal employment in private sector jobs 
is likely to pay more than the minimum wage, the types of  jobs for 
which ex-militants have been trained are unlikely to attract monthly 
salaries that can compete with the monthly stipends paid by the PAP. 
As a result, the stipend has tended to act as a disincentive rather than 
an incentive to seek employment. This was recognised by a PAP official, 
who told me ‘skilled labour can hardly really pay that much… it makes 
no sense to accept a job that will pay less than the monthly stipend. This 
is a disincentive for most of  them to take up regular employment.’7
The PAP was supposed to end after five years, in December 2015, 
but it has continued to receive government funding and support. In 
2016, President Buhari extended the programme to December 2017 
(Daily Post 2016). The FGN later announced that it would provide up 
to US$86 million in additional funds to extend the PAP throughout 
2018 (THISDAY 2017). These extensions were prompted by protests 
by ex-militants, who claimed that they had not been successfully 
reintegrated. Their protests intensified when the government briefly 
suspended payments of  monthly stipends in 2016 (Daily Post 2016). 
Many former militants continue to depend on the PAP for their 
livelihood, and while this situation continues there is no indication that 
it will be politically possible for the Nigerian government to terminate 
the PAP without jeopardising the peace and rehabilitation process.
5 Conclusion
The lack of  an exit plan for the PAP and the failure to achieve the 
objective of  facilitating employment for ex-militants has created a 
conundrum for the FGN. I argue that the lack of  an exit strategy 
has occurred largely because the programme failed to give adequate 
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attention to the needs of  private sector employers in the non-oil and gas 
sector, both qualitatively (the types of  skills required) and quantitatively 
(the potential to create job vacancies and absorb workers), or to the 
prevailing wage rates offered by private sector employers in the region. 
To a large extent, the PAP has become a disguised subsidy programme 
for unemployed and underemployed youth in the Niger Delta. This 
flaw in the programme’s detailed design and implementation has made 
it difficult to achieve a sustainable benefit. Instead, both ex-militants 
and successive governments have used the PAP as leverage in political 
bargaining in the Niger Delta.
The article has also shown that there is a mismatch between the needs 
of  the private sector and the ambitions of  young people in the Niger 
Delta. Youths in the region aspire to be engaged in the oil industry, but 
that sector is unable to meet the demand for jobs in the region. This 
analysis suggests that an overarching strategy is urgently needed to 
diversify economic development in the Niger Delta, creating a space for 
other kinds of  private enterprise besides the oil and gas industry, and 
an expansion of  job opportunities. In the meantime, there is a need 
for programmes that seek to facilitate a transition into employment to 
be informed by robust evidence of  the economic and business realities 
on the ground. It is not enough for the government to set out to train 
young people, welcome though such opportunities may be. These 
trainings must be based on a clear needs assessment of  private sector 
employers as well as the aspirations of  young people.
Despite the challenges that have been identified with Nigeria’s PAP, 
the need for these types of  programmes remain urgent. However, the 
design and implementation of  such programmes needs to be innovative 
and grounded in empirical understanding of  the context of  societies 
that have experienced armed conflicts. Programmes that are not based 
on this detailed analysis cannot guarantee employment for youths, 
including those who have experienced armed conflict. While it remains 
important to mobilise the private sector as a generator of  employment 
for youths in FCAS, it is important to clarify how this mechanism 
would work in practice. Any programme that seeks to stimulate youth 
employment, in which the private sector will be a key player, should 
focus on both the demand and supply sides of  the labour relationship 
between business employers and youths seeking employment.
Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 Centre for Research on Peace and Development, KU Leuven, 
Belgium.
2 www.osapnd.gov.ng/ndap.
3 Interview with DDR official, 13 February 2014, Abuja, Nigeria.
4 Interview with DDR official. In addition, the PAP established an Oil 
and Gas Committee to facilitate the employment of  ex-militants in 
the oil industry.
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5 Interview with DDR official, 13 February 2014.
6 Interview with ex-militant, 5 November 2014.
7 ibid.
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